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Abstract
The Chor-Rivest cryptosystem, based on a high-density knapsack problem on a
finite field Fqh , was broken by S. Vaudenay for q ≈ 200, h ≈ 24, and h admitting
a factor s verifying a certain condition. A new set of parameters q and h,
which prevent this cryptosystem against Vaudenay’s attack, is presented and
the computational aspects of its implementation in the Magma computational
algebra system are analyzed.
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1. Introduction
The objective of cryptography is to assure the secrecy and confidentiality
of communications and the goal of cryptanalysis is to break the security and
privacy of such communications ([12, 13]). In particular, in Public Key Cryptog-
raphy (PKC) each user has two keys: The public key, which is publicly known
and it is used by the sender to encrypt a message; and the private key, which
is kept in secret by the receiver and it is used by him to decrypt encrypted
messages. In general, PKC bases its security on the computational intractabil-
ity of some Number Theory problems, such as factorization problem, discrete
logarithm problem and knapsack problem.
In 1985, Chor proposed a cryptosystem based on the knapsack problem (see
[2, 3]). The last —and the only really efficient— attack to this system has been
proposed by Vaudenay ([17]), but only for the parameters originally proposed.
The Chor-Rivest cryptosystem is based on the arithmetic of finite fields and
it needs to compute discrete logarithms in order to determine the keys of the
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system. The Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) can be defined as follows:
Given a prime integer p, a generator α of the cyclic group Z∗p, and an element
β ∈ Z∗p, the DLP consists in finding an integer x, 0 < x ≤ p−1, such that β = αx.
This problem is considered to be difficult because the best known algorithm for
solving it is the number field sieve ([16]) which has a subexponential expected
running time:
O
(
e((64/9)
1/3+o(1))(ln p)1/3(ln ln p)2/3)
)
.
The security of the cryptosystem depends on the knapsack problem but not
on the discrete logarithm problem. In fact, if the DLP becomes tractable, then
the Chor-Rivest cryptosystem is easier to implement, but not easier to break.
As other knapsack cryptosystems, Chor-Rivest cryptosystem is not a very
popular public key cryptosystem. Some of its drawbacks are that it needs a
large time for generating its keys and a big size of public keys.
Nevertheless, nowadays more knapsack-based cryptosystems are being pro-
posed in order to consider new candidates in PKC (see, for example, [18] and
the references therein). One of the main reasons argued by the authors to state
that their cryptosystem is secure was that it resists the low-density attacks, due
to the fact that its density is 1.2, which is bigger than 0.9408 (see [1, 4, 14]).
Although the system resists low-density attacks, it was recently broken in [19]
by means of a heuristic attack, which permits to recover the private key from
the public key. This is an added reason to study the security of some of the most
important knapsack proposed, as it is the case of Chor-Rivest cryptosystem.
Moreover, the recommendations for the most popular public key cryptosys-
tems (RSA, ElGamal, etc.) suggest to increase the size of their parameters, due,
basically, to the results in quantum computation and in the improvements of
the computational time for some number theory problems (see [9, 10]). In this
way, the recommended bitlength of the keys are around 2048-4096 (for example,
nowadays there are millions of ID cards in Europe with keys of these sizes).
For these reasons, it is relevant and of interest to study safe alternative
cryptosystems, and the Chor-Rivest cryptosystem may be one of them.
In spite of several attacks against Chor-Rivest cryptosystem have been pro-
posed (see [2, 3]):
• low-density attacks.
• nothing known (by E. Brickell),
• known g and r,
• known t and r,
• known t (by O. Goldreich),
• known pi and r (by A. Odlizko),
none of them is efficient without knowing a part of the private key.
In [17] the Chor-Rivest cryptosystem was broken for the original proposed
parameters, i.e., when the cryptosystem is defined over a finite field Fqh with
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q ≈ 200 and h ≈ 24. This attack is based on a weakness derived from the fact
that the cryptosystem is insecure if the parameter h has a factor s verifying the
following condition:
s ≥
√
h+ 14 +
1
2 . (1)
In order to avoid Vaudenay’s attack, in [7] a new pair of parameters has been
determined for using safely this cryptosystem. In fact, these parameters were
computed in a suitable range guaranteeing its security and its computational
feasibility; such parameters are q = 409 and h = 17. Only a new pair of values
was obtained! This is clearly not useful for cryptographic applications.
Here, we present a new set of parameters q and h, which prevent Chor-Rivest
cryptosystem against Vaudenay’s attack. Moreover, the main computational
aspects of its implementation in the Magma computational algebra system are
analyzed. These results show that there are many (in fact, infinite) values of
new parameters for which Vaudenay’s attack are unfeasible, which is relevant
from a cryptographic point of view. In addition, this new implementation is
more efficient than that proposed in [6].
2. Preliminaries
A brief description (see [2, 3, 7] for the details), of the Chor-Rivest cryp-
tosystem is as follows:
1. Choose a prime number q and an integer h ≤ q so that the DLP can be
efficiently solved in the finite field Fqh . This fact is important to generate
the keys because this generation needs to compute discrete logarithms in
the group F∗qh . The reason is that the DLP can be solve in a efficient way
by using the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm if the order of the multiplicative
group considered, n = qh−1, factorizes as a product of small prime factors
([12, 15]).
2. Select a random algebraic element of degree h over Fqh , t, and a ran-
dom irreducible monic polynomial, f(t), of degree h, such that Fqh ≈
Fq[t]/(f(t)).
3. Choose a random generator, g, of the group F∗qh . Such generator can be
chosen at random in F∗qh until it verifies g
(qh−1)/l 6= 1 for all prime divisors,
l, of qh − 1.
4. Compute the discrete logarithms logg(t+ αi) = ai, ∀αi ∈ Fq.
5. Generate a random permutation of q elements, pi : {0, 1, . . . , q − 1} →
{0, 1, . . . , q − 1} and compute bi = api(i).
6. Add a random noise, 0 ≤ r ≤ qh − 2, to obtain the elements of the
knapsack: ci ≡ (bi + r) (mod qh − 1), 0 ≤ i ≤ q − 1, which are the public
key.
7. The private key is formed by the values (t, g, pi, r).
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The messages to be encrypted, M , are binary vectors of length q and weight
h ([5]), i.e.,
M = (m0,m1, . . . ,mq−1), mi ∈ {0, 1},
q−1∑
i=0
mi = h.
The ciphertext corresponding to a message M is:
E =
q−1∑
i=0
mici (mod qh − 1).
For decryption, M is obtained from E as follows:
i. Compute s ≡ E − hr (mod qh − 1).
ii. Obtain the polynomial of degree h− 1, given by Q(t) = gs (mod f(t)).
iii. Determine the h roots, αpi(i), of f(t) +Q(t) in Fq, such that,
f(t) +Q(t) =
∏
i∈I
(t+ αpi(i)).
iv. Apply pi−1 to the roots αpi(i) for recovering the coordinates of the original
message, M , having the bit 1.
3. New and safer parameters
The first efficient attack against the Chor-Rivest cryptosystem for the orig-
inal proposed parameters in [2, 3] (i.e., q ∼= 200, h ∼= 24), is developed in [17],
assuming, in addition, h has a factor verifying the condition (1).
After that, some new parameters have been found, say q = 409, h = 17,
keeping the safety of the cryptosystem and some important properties, like
density, size of the public knapsack, etc. (see [7] for more information). Never-
theless, this pair of parameters, is too restrictive in order to develop practical
implementations. For this reason, in the present study the restrictions consid-
ered in [7] have been relaxed in order to determine new pairs of the parameters
(q, h) and thus to obtain a larger set of parameters for implementations of the
cryptosystem, but keeping the same level of safety and avoiding Vaudenay’s
attack.
In order to avoid Vaudenay’s attack we first need to determine those param-
eters h for which no divisor s verifies the condition (1). We obtain
Proposition 1. If an integer h has no factor s verifying the inequality (1) then
h is either a prime number or the square of a prime number.
Proof. Assume h is not prime and let k be the least prime divisor of h. Hence,
h = s · k, s ∈ Z, s ≥ k. If s = k, the result follows. If s > k, then the inequality
s <
√
h+ 14 +
1
2 implies
(
s− 12
)2
< h+ 14 , and simplifying s(s− 1) < h = s · k.
Hence, s− 1 < k, thus leading us to k < s < k + 1, which is not possible. ¤
The conditions for obtaining the new range of parameters are the following:
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(a) 2 ≤ h ≤ q, q being a prime number and h being either a prime number or
the square of a prime number.
(b) 1035 < n = qh − 1, that is, the number of digits of n is t(q, h) ≥ 36.
(c) The bitlength of the public key for (q, h) satisfies l(q, h) < 150000.
(d) The density, d(q, h), for the knapsack is much bigger than 1, to avoid all
known attacks to low-density knapsack cryptosystems.
(e) The smoothness of n, u(n), i.e., the greatest prime factor of n has at most
18 decimal digits: u(n) ≤ 18.
These conditions are justified taking the following facts into account:
• First, Vaudenay’s attack is not applicable if condition (a) is assumed. In
fact, as q is a prime number and h is prime or the square of a prime
number, h has no factors and the condition (1) has no sense.
• Condition (b) is less restrictive than that considered in [6], but the cryp-
tosystem is still safe because no attack is known under the assumption of
conditions (a) and (b).
• Condition (c) has been considered because of Lenstra’s conjecture ([11]),
which states that knowing the whole public knapsack could be a weakness
for the system. Hence, the idea is to publish only a half (or less) of the
public key. Note that the cryptosystem still works in this case.
Condition (d) remains unchanged as no outstanding improvements have
been published in relation to the attacks against the value of the density
of a knapsack. In fact, the improvement published in [8] considers that is
possible to break a system if its density is < 1. But this bound cannot be
applied to the results obtained below (see Table 1).
• Finally, condition (e) is considered under the assumption that the number
of bit operations per day of a standard PC is around 1014. This value for
the smoothness of n, u(n) ≤ 18, has been obtained carrying out similar
computations to those in [6].
In Table 1 the 44 pairs (q, h) verifying the conditions (a)-(e) are shown.
Table 1: Pairs of parameters (q, h) verifying the conditions (a)-(e).
h q t(q, h) l(q, h) d(q, h) u(n)
13 547 36 64546 4.626 14
13 571 36 67949 4.796 13
13 577 36 68663 4.838 14
13 599 37 71281 4.994 13
13 601 37 72120 5.008 11
13 613 37 73560 5.092 15
13 631 37 75720 5.218 11
13 641 37 77561 5.288 17
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Table 1: Pairs of parameters (q, h) verifying the conditions (a)-(e).
h q t(q, h) l(q, h) d(q, h) u(n)
13 659 37 79739 5.413 16
13 683 37 83326 5.579 14
13 719 38 88437 5.828 15
13 757 38 93868 6.088 16
13 787 38 98375 6.292 15
13 797 38 99625 6.360 13
13 839 39 105714 6.644 11
13 877 39 111379 6.900 16
13 887 39 112649 6.967 16
13 941 39 120448 7.327 14
13 953 39 121984 7.407 16
13 967 39 123776 7.500 14
13 977 39 126033 7.566 16
13 1093 40 143183 8.329 13
13 1123 40 147113 8.524 16
17 127 36 14986 1.068 15
17 131 36 15589 1.095 15
17 167 38 20875 1.330 14
17 193 39 24897 1.495 17
17 233 41 30989 1.742 15
17 263 42 35768 1.924 15
17 277 42 37949 2.008 15
17 317 43 44697 2.244 17
17 331 43 47002 2.326 17
17 409 45 60123 2.773 9
17 433 45 64084 2.908 18
17 587 48 91572 3.754 14
17 643 48 101594 4.054 17
17 661 48 105099 4.150 16
23 173 52 29410 1.011 18
23 191 53 33234 1.095 18
23 199 53 34825 1.132 15
23 283 57 52921 1.510 16
23 563 64 118230 2.679 14
25 601 70 138230 2.604 17
25 613 70 141603 2.648 16
Table 2 shows the pairs of parameters for which the q discrete logarithms can
be computed over in one day, approximately. This computation has been made
by using the Magma implementation presented in §4, with a Pentium D-930 3.00
GHz, 2.00 GB RAM. In this Table, the column Total Time contains the number
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of seconds of CPU time needed for the calculation of the q logarithms; while
the column Average Time is filled with the average time, in seconds, required
to calculate each of the q logarithms.
Table 2: Pairs (q, h) for which logg(t + i), 0 ≤ i ≤ q − 1, can be
computed in 1 day, approximately.
h q Total Time Average Time
17 409 198.109 0.484
13 601 3454.592 5.748
13 631 7308.658 11.583
13 839 14719.431 17.544
13 599 32918.392 54.956
13 797 77935.191 97.786
13 571 80912.053 141.702
13 577 88155.129 152.782
17 167 98539.430 590.056
4. Implementation with Magma software
Magma is a Computer Algebra System designed to solve problems in alge-
bra, number theory, geometry and combinatorics that may involve sophisticated
mathematics and which are computationally hard. Magma provides a mathe-
matically rigorous environment which emphasizes structural computation. The
kernel of Magma contains implementations of many of the important concrete
classes of structure in five fundamental branches of algebra, namely group the-
ory, ring theory, field theory, module theory and the theory of algebras. That
is why we choose Magma, a more appropriate software than that used in [6].
Maple allows to develop mathematics with a more accessible and easy to use
software, but Magma is a large, well-supported software package designed to
solve computationally hard problems in algebra.
The implementation of Chor-Rivest cryptosystem with Magma software is
composed by several procedures. The main procedures are related to the gener-
ation of the keys, and to encrypt and decrypt messages. We will present these
procedures with detail. Moreover, there are other procedures necessary to trans-
form the messages in a suitable way (see [2, 3]), to determine the generator of
the multiplicative group, and to generate the permutation; but they are not an
essential part of the cryptosystem implementation.
The public and private keys are generated by means of the procedure keys
in the following way. Once they are obtained, the public and the private keys
can be saved in two files for their later use.
First of all, the finite field of q elements, Fq, is defined, and then an extension
of it is considered. After defining the finite field and its extension, it is necessary
to compute some discrete logarithms.
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keys:=procedure(iq, ih)
// Initial parameters
n:=iq^ih-1; //order of the multiplicative group
Fq:=GF(iq); //base finite field
P<x>:=PolynomialRing(Fq);
f:=IrreduciblePolynomial(Fq, ih); //irreducible polynomial
F<t>:=ext<Fq|f>; //extension of the base field
g:=primitive(F); //generator of the group
permut:=permutation(iq);//permutation
r:=Random(iq^ih-2);//noise
b:=[]; c:=[]; logs:=[];
// Computation of discrete logarithms
for i in [0 .. iq-1] do
logs[i+1]:=Log(g,t+i);
end for;
// Computation of the public key
for i in [1 .. iq] do
b[i]:=logs[permut[i]+1];
c[i]:=(b[i]+r) mod n;
end for;
end procedure;
The procedure for encrypting a message is as follows. First of all, the sender
considers the text of his message, M , computes the length and the number of
blocks of the message, transforms and divides the message into blocks of the
same length, and transforms it in blocks of length q and weight h (see the
corresponding algorithm in [2, 3]). Later, the sender encrypts the message and
saves it in a file.
encrypt:=procedure(iq, ih)
// Initial parameters
inMens:=plaintext; N:=iq^ih-1; ltext:=#inMens;
lengt:=Ilog2(Binomial(iq,ih)); lblock:=Floor(lengt/8);
lmess:=lblock*Ceiling(ltext/lblock);
nblocks:=Floor(lmess/lblock); Scii:=[]; Sciic:=[];
// The message is transformed to ASCII and 0’s are added if needed
Scara:=ElementToSequence(inMens);
for i in [1..#Scara] do
Scii[i]:=StringToCode(Scara[i]);
end for;
for i in [1..lmess] do
if i le ltext then
Sciic[i]:=Scii[i];
else
Sciic[i]:=0;
end if;
end for;
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// Transformation of the message
messblock1:=[[]: s in [1..nblocks]]; messblock:=[];
mess256:=[]; M:=[]; E:=[];
for i in [1..nblocks] do
lim1:=(i-1)*lblock+1; lim2:=i*lblock; k:=1;
for j in [lim1..lim2] do
lim3:=lim2-lim1+j; messblock1[i][k]:=Sciic[j]; k:=k+1;
end for;
end for;
//representation in base-256
for m in [1..nblocks] do
aux:=0;
for l in [1..lblock] do
aux:=aux + messblock1[m][l]*256^(l-1);
end for;
mess256[m]:=Intseq(aux,10); aux2:=0;
for n in [1..#mess256[m]] do
aux2:=aux2+mess256[m][n]*10^(n-1);
end for;
messblock[m]:=aux2;
// Transformation of the message into blocks of length q and weight h
// by using a procedure called Transformation
M[m]:=Transformation(messblock[m],iq,ih); aux3:=0;
// Encryption process
for p in [1..inq] do
aux3:=(aux3+M[m][p]*publicK[p]) mod N;
end for;
E[m]:=aux3;
end for;
end procedure;
The procedure for decrypting an encrypted message, which was saved in a
file, is the following.
decrypted:=procedure(iq, ih)
// Initial parameters
cipherMess:=ciphertext;//encrypted text
nblocks:=#cipherMess; N:=iq^ih-1; //length and number of blocks
// Initialization
sprime:=[]; Q:=[]; pol:=[]; aux:=[]; roots:=[]; Raux:=[];
R:=[[],[]]; Paux:=[]; Pos:=[]; m:=[]; Me:=[];
Mes:=[]; Message:="";
// Decryption
for i in [1..nblocks] do
sprime[i]:=(cipherMess[i]-inh*r) mod N; Q[i]:=g^sprime[i];
aux:=Eltseq(Q[i]); aux2:=P!aux;
pol[i]:=Factorization(f+aux2); //factorization of the polynomial
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roots[i]:=Roots(f+aux2);//roots of the polynomial
m[i]:=[0:i in [0..inq]];
//positions of the 1’s using the permutation
for j in [1..inh] do
Raux[j]:=-roots[i][j][1];
Paux[j]:=Position(permut,Raux[j]);
m[i][Paux[j]]:=1;
end for;
// Transformation of integer numbers into binary ones (inverse
// transformation) by using the a procedure called ITransformation
Me[i]:=ITransformation(m[i],iq,ih);
Mes[i]:=Intseq(Me[i],256); //return to base-256 representation
// Recovering the original message
for k in [1..#Mes[i]] do
Maux:=CodeToString(Mes[i][k]);
Message:=Message cat Maux;
end for;
R[i]:=Raux; Pos[i]:=Sort(Paux);
end for;
end procedure;
5. Computational results
We have encrypted and decrypted several messages with different lengths in
order to measure the running time needed in different cases. To do this, we have
considered the pairs of parameters listed in Table 2, and the results obtained
are shown in Table 3.
For these pairs of values, we have considered Lenstra’s conjecture ([11]).
Thus, we have made public different number of elements of the public key. This
number of published elements is represented by PKN and the length of each
block of the message is given in parentheses. In this sense, we have measured
the time to encrypt and decrypt messages considering a part of the whole public
knapsack. For each value of q we have considered a half part of them, then a
quarter part, and finally the 10% of the public key.
The variables analyzed in this experimental computation are the following:
Text length: TL (measured in KB); number of characters of the message: CM
(adding 0’s if needed); number of blocks of the message: BN; and the Encryption
and Decryption Time (in seconds): ET and DT, respectively. The messages
considered have 50 KB (around 49896 characters) and 192 KB (around 191727
characters).
Table 3: Experimental computational results for the pairs (q, h)
listed in Table 2.
Parameters PKN TL CM BN ET DT
(409, 17) 205 50 49900 4990 4.250 14.859
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Table 3: Experimental computational results for the pairs (q, h)
listed in Table 2.
Parameters PKN TL CM BN ET DT
(10) 192 191730 19173 16.078 59.093
(409, 17) 102 50 49896 7128 3.328 20.766
(7) 192 191730 27390 12.938 81.875
(409, 17) 41 50 49892 12473 2.531 35.734
(4) 192 191728 47932 9.281 138.797
(601, 13) 301 50 49896 5544 5.500 11.750
(9) 192 191727 21303 21.172 46.922
(601, 13) 150 50 49896 7128 3.906 14.672
(7) 192 191730 27390 14.718 58.218
(601, 13) 60 50 49895 9979 2.406 20.125
(5) 192 191730 38346 8.859 79.234
(631, 13) 316 50 49896 5544 5.922 12.234
(9) 192 191727 21303 22.437 48.953
(631, 13) 158 50 49896 7128 4.094 15.328
(7) 192 191730 27390 15.593 60.859
(631, 13) 63 50 49895 9979 2.484 21.172
(5) 192 191730 38346 9.312 83.078
(839, 13) 420 50 49900 4990 6.610 11.437
(10) 192 191730 19173 25.390 45.640
(839, 13) 210 50 49896 6237 4.515 13.781
(8) 192 191728 23966 17156 54.875
(839, 13) 84 50 49896 8316 2.562 18.016
(6) 192 191730 31955 9.672 70.781
(599, 13) 300 50 49896 5544 5.562 11.953
(9) 192 191727 21303 21.047 47.750
(599, 13) 150 50 49896 7128 3.921 14.953
(7) 192 191730 27390 14.625 56.250
(599, 13) 60 50 49895 9979 2.360 20.485
(5) 192 191730 38346 8.875 80.500
(797, 13) 399 50 49896 5544 8.093 12.562
(9) 192 191727 21303 31.046 49.750
(797, 13) 199 50 49896 6237 4.218 13.640
(8) 192 191728 23966 16.094 54.234
(797, 13) 80 50 49896 8316 2.500 17.844
(6) 192 191730 31955 9.187 70.094
(571, 13) 286 50 49896 5544 5.140 11.656
(9) 192 191727 21303 19.594 46.468
(571, 13) 143 50 49896 7128 3.625 14.594
(7) 192 191730 27390 13.844 57.796
(571, 13) 57 50 49895 9979 2.328 19.875
(5) 192 191730 38346 8.453 78.266
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Table 3: Experimental computational results for the pairs (q, h)
listed in Table 2.
Parameters PKN TL CM BN ET DT
(577, 13) 289 50 49896 5544 5.249 11.172
(9) 192 191727 21303 19.797 44.860
(577, 13) 144 50 49896 7128 3.704 14.016
(7) 192 191730 27390 13.968 55.578
(577, 13) 58 50 49895 9979 2.266 19.203
(5) 192 191730 38346 8.703 75.234
(167, 17) 84 50 49896 7128 2.703 15.625
(7) 192 191730 27390 10.156 62.016
(167, 17) 42 50 49892 12473 2.500 26.609
(4) 192 191728 47932 9.359 104.281
(167, 17) 20 50 49891 49891 4.453 104.312
(1) 192 191727 191727 16.438 406.844
If all the pairs of the parameters listed in Table 3 are analyzed, the best pair
for the encryption process is the last one, namely (167, 17). In this case, the
block length is the smallest one. This value depends only on the values of q and
h and is calculated with the expression log2
(
q
h
)
(and divided by 8).
For the decryption process, the values are similar, and the best one is the
pair (577, 13), with a block length equals to 10 bits.
Finally, as it could be observed, the decryption process is slower than the
encryption process in all cases.
6. Conclusions
We have studied and implemented the Chor-Rivest cryptosystem with Magma
software by using a larger range of safe parameters than those suggested in pre-
vious proposals. For these parameters no attack has been described. Moreover,
we have presented a Magma implementation of this cryptosystem suitable for
the set of these new parameters in an efficient way.
The implementation opens a door to the future in order to use realistically
the Chor-Rivest cryptosystem, based on the fact that no attack has yet been
proposed when the parameters q, h determined above, are used.
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